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Viewing cable 07ANKARA1842, TURKISH ELECTIONS: ANALYSTS ASSESS MILITARY

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Reference ID	Date	Classification	Origin
07ANKARA1842	2007-07-19 11:11	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Ankara

VZCZCXRO7097 PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHAK #1842/01 2001139 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 191139Z JUL 07 FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3032 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0993 RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU PRIORITY 1521 RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI PRIORITY 3120 RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN PRIORITY 1293 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 5826 RHMFISS/39ABG INCIRLIK AB TU PRIORITY RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 0785 RHMFISS/425ABS IZMIR TU//CC// PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2427 RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5// PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP:PDUSDP/ISA:EUR/ISA:NESA/DSCA// PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001842   SIPDIS   SIPDIS   E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2017  TAGS: PGOV PREL TU SUBJECT: TURKISH ELECTIONS: ANALYSTS ASSESS MILITARY  CONFIDENCE IN ELECTION OUTCOME   Classified By: DCM Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b,d).   ¶1. (C) Summary: Experts on civil-military relations in Ankara  contend the Turkish General Staff (TGS) is satisfied with the  process set in motion by its April 27 warning and the  Constitutional Court's subsequent decision on the presidency  vote which brought Turkey to early elections.  Analysts claim  that the military and pro-secular opposition parties, buoyed  by mass pro-secular demonstrations in May and June, believe  that even if the AKP emerges from July 22 elections able to  form a single-party government, it will be forced to accept a  consensus candidate for the presidency.  Despite these claims  of confidence, the military continues to work to exploit  debate over a cross-border operation against PKK terrorists,  as well as press allegations that the US is either directly  or indirectly providing weapons to the PKK, to make the AKP  government appear weak on security.  And of course there is  the possibility of a last ditch attempt by the military --  via public statements, policy maneuvering, or partisan  manipulation -- to sway undecided voters towards secular  opposition parties.  Military reaction to the elections may  be affected by the TGS's all-consuming annual exercise of the  Supreme Military Council, which starts August 1.  End Summary   ¶2. (C) The crisis atmosphere following the TGS's April 27  warning, which led many to fear some kind of military  intervention, has been replaced by more traditional  politicking in the final stretch to July 22 national  elections.  After public sparring with the government in May  and June over who would take responsibility for a  cross-border operation against PKK terrorists in northern  Iraq -- designed to show the AKP government as soft on  terrorism -- the TGS has refrained from public statements on  domestic political issues for the past two weeks.  Chief of  Defense Gen Buyukanit and Deputy CHOD Saygun enjoyed  scheduled vacations on the coast in late June and early July.   ¶3. (C) According to Ankara University professor Tanel  Demirel, the TGS achieved its primary short-term objective  via the April 27 announcement: preventing Abdullah Gul from  becoming president and ensuring a Constitutional Court ruling  raising the vote threshold for president to 367.  The head of  the secular and nationalist Ataturk Thought Association  (ADD), retired General Sener Eruygur, pointed to the large  turn-out at pro-secular rallies in Istanbul, Izmir and other  cities as proof pro-secular forces are rising to challenge  the AKP.   ¶4. (C) Several observers, such as Bilkent University  professor and military analyst Umit Cizre, identify the  pivotal moment in the AKP's relations with the military as  the private May 4 meeting between PM Erdogan and CHOD  Buyukanit at the Dolmabahce palace in Istanbul.  Although  Cizre and other analysts are not sure what happened during  the 2.5 hour session, they conclude that Buyukanit and  Erdogan reached some understanding.  Ankara University  professor Nuran Yildiz believes Buyukanit made military "red  lines" over the presidency clear to Erdogan at that  encounter.  All agree that the situation relaxed considerably  after that.   ¶5. (C) Analysts' views vary widely on the significance of the  military's April 27 internet warning that it was ready to  intervene to protect Turkey's secular democracy.  Cizre and  Demirel believe the April 27 statement was both harmful and  unnecessary since the Constitutional Court was poised anyway  to affirm a 367 quorum requirement for the presidency and  thus defeat Gul's candidacy, precipitating early elections.  Yildiz and others, including retired general Riza Kucukoglu  at Ankara's Eurasian Studies Institute (ASAM), assert the  military has played its role correctly in counterbalancing  AKP attempts to monopolize all major power centers.  Even  critics of the military's announcement, such as Ankara  University professor Bedriye Poyraz, believe that the AKP  provoked military intervention by blatant attempts to fill   ANKARA 00001842  002 OF 002    the government bureaucracy with its supporters and its  ill-considered nomination of Gul for president.  They  acknowledge that, despite criticism of the military's  intervention by some intellectuals and pundits, most Turks  see it as natural, if not appropriate, for the generals to  make their political views known.   ¶6. (C) Looking at post-election scenarios, most observers  with whom we have spoken tell us the military can live with  another AKP government, as long as the president is a secular  figure selected by consensus.  The prospect of the AKP  cooperating with independent Kurdish deputies in order to  form a government is more controversial, as this would bring  together the military and secular establishment's two  archenemies: "Islamists and separatists."  While Cizre  believes the generals could tolerate an alliance of AKP and  Kurdish independents as long as the president is secular,  ADD's Eruygur termed such an alliance a "nightmare" for  Turkey.  ASAM's Kucukoglu asserted that the military would be  uncomfortable with independent Kurdish MPs, citing their past  behavior (in the early 1990s, the previous iteration of  pro-Kurdish MPs attempted to take the parliamentary oath in  Turkish and made statements that triggered the lifting of  their parliamentary immunity and eventual prosecution).  He  claimed, however, that military coups are no longer  necessary, now that the majority of Turks who favor  secularism have found their voice.   ¶7. (C) Comment: Despite analysts' claims of military  confidence, the generals are clearly working behind the  scenes, using ongoing PKK terrorism and the debate over the  necessity of a cross-border operation into northern Iraq to  portray the AKP as weak on terrorism.  We also detect the  military's hand behind recent allegations that the U.S. has,  either directly or indirectly, provided weapons to the PKK in  northern Iraq.   This is also designed to weaken AKP's  national security credentials and encourage undecided voters  to turn to "tougher" pro-secular parties.  While the military  could roil the waters and make a public statement on the  elections at any time, its post-election reaction may be  delayed by the August 1 start of annual, and all-consuming,  Supreme Military Council (YAS) promotions and assignments  deliberations.  End Comment.   Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at  http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/   WILSON

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